The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

UNITED STATES POLICY ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OPERATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PATRICK A. MURPHY
United States Army National Guard

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:

Approved for Public Release.

Distribution is Unlimited.





U.S. ARMY, WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20000526 087

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

UNITED STATES POLICY ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OPERATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT

by

LTC PATRICK A. MURPHY ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

Colonel Barringer Fox Wingard Jr.
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

> DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

ii

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR:

Patrick A. Murphy

TITLE:

United States Policy on Humanitarian Intervention Operations and the Role of the

Reserve Component

FORMAT:

Strategy Research Project

DATE:

10 April 2000

PAGES: 24

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Humanitarian intervention, for all practical purposes, can be considered the combined taskings of humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement operations. In other words, the application of military force, or threat of its use, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designated to establish order, restore peace and relieve human suffering. Intervention also implies the need to forcibly deal with one or more belligerents. The military receives this mission when all other elements of national power have been ineffective in relieving human suffering. The purpose of this paper is to examine current United States policy on humanitarian intervention and the feasibility of an expanded role for the Reserve Components in future operations. Policy analysis starts by examining how humanitarian intervention operations find their roots in the National Security Strategy. Current policy is evaluated for its adequacy and recommendations are made for possible changes. The thesis of this paper is that while the current administration does have a policy addressing humanitarian intervention, it is derived from several sources, it does not provide clear guidance for deployment strategies, and the policy deserves a greater degree of clarity. The overall conclusion is that it is feasible to increase the Reserve Components role in humanitarian intervention operations. This provided issues like training, equipping, resourcing, frequency of deployments and civilian employer incentives are addressed. Any policy in regards to humanitarian intervention operations should have as a foundation a clear set of guidelines for commitment of U.S. forces. As a world leader, the United States should have a policy that allows for a consistent application of assistance when faced with the opportunity to relieve human suffering. Current policy does not specifically address these issues with the needed clarity.

i٧

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| ABSTRACTIII |
|--|
| UNITED STATES POLICY ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OPERATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT |
| POLICY BACKGROUND1 |
| A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE3 |
| CURRENT POLICY ANALYSIS4 |
| FUTURE PROJECTION5 |
| ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS6 |
| DISADVANTAGE TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OPERATION PARTICIPATION9 |
| OPTIONS / COURSES OF ACTION9 |
| RECOMMENDATION10 |
| CONCLUSION11 |
| ENDNOTES |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY17 |

vi

UNITED STATES POLICY ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OPERATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENT

We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and legal documents.

— UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar¹

As the United States moves into the 21st century, there will continue to be new and difficult challenges to face in the international arena. Internal conflict and instability within developing countries and those considered to be failed states will continue as it has in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, and most recently Kosovo. Events in these failed states had progressed to a point where political, diplomatic and economic measures were unable to alleviate human suffering. The idea of respecting human rights and the ethical responsibility to relieve human suffering has been an impetus for the United States to become involved in the affairs of other nation-states.

When all other elements of national power have been ineffective, use of military power may become necessary to support the relief of human suffering. The combination of military might and humanitarian assistance then becomes what we now refer to as humanitarian intervention.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze current United States humanitarian intervention operations policy, evaluate its adequacy, examine the role of the Reserve Components (RC) in these types of operations, and recommend changes in current policy. The thesis of this paper is that while the current administration does have a policy addressing humanitarian intervention, it is derived from several sources, it does not provide clear guidance for deployment strategies and the policy deserves a greater degree of clarity.

POLICY BACKGROUND

Current humanitarian intervention operations policy finds its roots in the three core national objectives: to enhance our security, bolster our economic prosperity, and promote democracy abroad.² For the purposes of this discussion, promoting democracy abroad encompasses the promotion of values and favorable world order. Within this framework, the intensity of interest is then determined and categorized as humanitarian. The three categories of intensity of interest are; vital interests, important national interests, and humanitarian and other interests.³

In the Annual Report to the President and Congress, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen addresses humanitarian operations under the heading of "The Defense Strategy: Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crises." As part of responding to the full spectrum of crises, "conducting smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations" is how Secretary Cohen has re-categorized humanitarian operations as well as a number of other types of SSC operations. It is suggested that these SSC operations could likely pose the most frequent challenges for U.S. forces and cumulatively require significant commitment over time.

Humanitarian intervention operations are defined in a number of ways. The humanitarian mission in Rwanda, for instance, was labeled a "relief operation" by President Clinton, a "humanitarian intervention" by former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and as an "assistance operation" in the National Military Strategy 95. Joint Publication 3-07 defines humanitarian assistance as:

Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disaster or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.⁶

For all practical purposes the terms "intervention" and "peace enforcement" have taken on similar meanings. Both Joint Publication 3-07 and the Army's Field Manual 100-23 define peace enforcement as, "the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order." Current military doctrine establishes that peace enforcement missions include intervention operations, as well as operations to restore order, enforce sanctions, forcibly separate belligerents, and establish and supervise exclusion zones for the purpose of establishing an environment for truce or cease-fire. Unlike other operations, intervention operations do not always begin with the consent of the governing body of the nation-state involved, or of other parties to the conflict or crisis.⁸

The only formally recognized international authorization for forcible intervention in a humanitarian crisis comes from the United Nations. Articles within Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter are used to lawfully enter another state without consent. Specifically, Article 41 authorizes the Security Council to "decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to its decisions..." and Article 42, which states that if Article 41 actions are inadequate, "it may take action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The idea of 'international peace and security' was addressed in a paper titled, "Challenges Confronting Collective Security: Humanitarian Intervention," written by David J. Scheffer, an international lawyer and at the time of this writing a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In his response to the question of, "... must there be a threat to international peace and security for the UN Security Council to consider either non-forcible or forcible humanitarian intervention," he wrote:

...the historical record establishes that all too often massive violations of human rights within a country, or man-made or natural disasters that initially occur within one state, inevitably have an impact on regional or international affairs. These "internal" events lead to one or a combination of consequences: (a) large refugee migrations, (b) internal armed conflicts that ultimately spill over national borders and trigger boarder armed conflicts, (c) dangerous pressures on the availability and distribution of regional resources, and (d) transnational environmental and health problems. At a minimum, regional stability is threatened. With the heightened recognition of ethnicity in the aftermath of the Cold War, there is even more at stake when an ethnic group within a state is subjected to mass violations of its collective human rights. Such gross violations will be far more likely now

to trigger the ethnic group at large either to react violently or, at a minimum, to call for unilateral or multinational intervention to save its ethnic brothers and sisters. 11

In the mid-1990's it was thought that UN peacekeeping had suffered as a result of ambiguous interpretations and definitions of the specific mandate and the strategic aims and objectives of the operations themselves. The two parallel operations which were mounted in Somalia, the one essentially humanitarian in intent, the other an enforcement action – in other words a humanitarian intervention operation – well illustrate the uncertainty and confusion which presently jeopardizes the effectiveness of peacekeeping initiatives. ¹²

The Somalia humanitarian intervention operation found the U.S. military responding to a presidential directive to execute Operation Restore Hope, which lasted from December 3, 1992 to May 4, 1993. As a joint and multi-national operation, Operation Restore Hope was U.S. led and UN sanctioned. Taskings included protection of humanitarian assistance and other peace enforcement operations. The area of operations included over 21,000 square miles. Over these distances, units conducted air assault operations, patrols, security operations, cordons and searches, and other combat operations in support of humanitarian agencies. ¹³

A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE

Reviewing the events and policies established over the last 15 years may provide additional insight when trying to better understand the current policy on humanitarian intervention operations. In 1984, Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, in remarks made to the National Press Club, presented the following six guidelines for use of military forces in any intervention operation.

- · Commit only if our allies' vital interests are at stake.
- If we commit, do so with all resources necessary to win.
- Go in with clear political and military objectives.
- Be ready to change the commitment if the objectives change, since wars rarely stand still.
- Only take on the commitment that can gain the support of the American people and the Congress.
- Commit U.S. forces only as a last resort.¹⁴

In 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry articulated four conditions under which commitment of military forces in humanitarian assistance operations was appropriate for U.S. involvement in Rwanda:

- The natural or man-made catastrophe dwarfs the ability of the normal agencies to respond.
- The need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to jump-start the effort.
- The response requires resources unique to the military.
- There is a minimum risk to the lives of American troops.

National Security Strategy 96 (NSS 96) specifically addresses the military as the only national agency that is expeditionary and the only national resource that has the capacity to conduct forced intervention for humanitarian operations. Forced intervention is assistance provided without an official

request from the country receiving the support. This same document made it very clear that the military is "generally" not "the best tool to address humanitarian concerns." A similar statement is made in the Quadrennial Defense Review dated May 1997. 17

Humanitarian intervention operations have been focused on the United States' concern for human rights and welfare, as well as the overarching Realpolitik issues, which tie back to the promotion of a favorable world order. Involvement in these types of operations obviously then has exposed our willingness to interfere in another country's affairs for the purpose of relieving human suffering and compelling a particular country to alter its domestic affairs.

CURRENT POLICY ANALYSIS

While it may be tempting to broadly categorize humanitarian intervention operations under humanitarian activities, clearly the commitment of U.S. forces requires a more specific policy as to when and under what conditions intervention is appropriate. Current policy seems to allow a great deal of latitude when it comes to the actual commitment of military assets. As stated earlier, there are several sources that refer to the fact that "....the U.S. military is generally not the best means of addressing a crisis." However, over the past ten years the United States has found itself more frequently involved in humanitarian activities, and more frequently willing to become involved through intervention.

Current policy speaks to the Military's unique capabilities that may be both necessary and appropriate when considering intervention. The criteria of when the unique capabilities are necessary and appropriate is addressed in the following statement:

When a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs that ability of civilian relief agencies to respond or when the need for immediate relief is urgent and only the U.S. military has the ability to jump-start the longer-term response to the disaster.

This statement continues by attempting to answer the question of under what condition is commitment of U.S. military necessary and appropriate:

The military mission should be clearly defined, the risk to American troops should be minimal, and substantial U.S. military involvement should be confined to the initial period of providing relief until broader international assistance efforts get underway. Followed by, ...where the commitment of U.S. forces is considered, determining whether the associated costs and risks are commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake should be the central calculus of U.S. decisions. Such decisions should also depend on our ability to identify a clear mission, the desired end-state of the situation, and the exit strategy for forces committed. ¹⁹

Obviously these policy statements capture many of the ideas presented by both Weinberger and Perry over the past 15 years.

Presidential Decision Directive (PPD) – 56, signed by President Clinton on May 20, 1997, attempts to describe the key elements of humanitarian intervention, but comes up short in terms of a coherent policy. PDD-56 also acknowledges that the use of the military in humanitarian situations should be a last resort. PDD-56 goes on to state a preference for coalition operations, but also expresses a desire to

maintain a capability for unilateral response.²⁰ Unfortunately, this PDD fails to address the central issue of when and what condition intervention should be pursued.

In support of PDD-56, the Institute for National Strategic Studies issued a report titled, "Improving the Utility of Presidential Decision Directive 56." This report concluded that PDD-56, if implemented as intended, provides a useful, versatile and acceptable (across the national security agencies) framework for achieving interagency unity of effort in complex contingency operations.

An issue not well addressed in current policy is that of the national interests of international/coalition partners, and the United States' commitment to multilateral intervention. The willingness to unilaterally commit U.S. forces has both direct and indirect affects on other world issues. The use of military forces in humanitarian intervention operations has frequently been viewed by other governments as interference in the internal affairs of another sovereign nation-state, and seen as a pretext for military intervention in order to achieve political or economic objectives. China, for example, believes all nations should refrain from involvement in human rights issues. This is a case where any action on foreign soil, with positive or negative results, subjects the United States to criticism.

Loss of life is another risk and always a possible result of intervention operations. This coupled with the possibility of an unsuccessful attempt during an intervention operation, could potentially, and probably will lead to loss of national will. With the continual threat to regional instability and the role of the United States as a world leader, operational events are likely to grow in number and frequency.

For the United States, the most dangerous consequence of frequent involvement in humanitarian intervention operations is loss of current military readiness. Currently, the use of U.S. forces for the purpose of humanitarian intervention operations potentially degrades the military's ability to prepare for, fight, and win future wars. Any willingness to increase military involvement in future operations will necessitate additional resources.

FUTURE PROJECTION

Humanitarian intervention operations will continue to increase especially with the potential for a growing number of failed states. According to a study done by the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, in the years between 1978 and 1985, there was an average of five ongoing complex (humanitarian) emergencies each year. By 1989 there were 14, by 1992 there were 17, and in 1996 there were 24 ongoing humanitarian activities.²² The United States finds itself involved militarily in a larger number of these operations.

Current trends indicate a continued reduction in resources for military operations. Current trends also indicate an environment of uncertainty and instability through the year 2010 and beyond. Budget reductions, along with the increase in need for participation in operational events around the world, suggest a major challenge. Regional stability will continue to be a vital interest as a part of the national security strategy. Requirements for military support and participation in humanitarian intervention

operations could potentially grow, thus draining valuable resources from domestic as well as foreign aid programs.

ROLE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

The Reserve Components²³ continue to serve an increasingly important role in the full spectrum of operations, which the United States military is asked to conduct. This change requires a new way of thinking, a shift in paradigm for many leaders. Policy-makers and senior military leadership will need to shift from a philosophy of holding Reserve Component forces as a strategic reserve, to thinking of them as an integral part of nearly every operation. Reserve Component personnel often bring more than just their military skills with them, they also bring a wealth of experiences from the civilian sector. For example, civilian sector skills that Reserve Component personnel bring to the "fight" include; communications, law enforcement, engineering, civil affairs, medical, agriculture, and construction skills. The full integration of reserve and active component units ensures the involvement of the American people in the nation's security.

The National Military Strategy envisions that the United States could be presented with the challenge of fighting two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRC). If this was to happen, many of the Army's senior leaders have stated in a non-attribution environment that it is questionable whether current Active Component force structure can support two near-simultaneous MRCs. This again would support the notion of using the military's full land and air combat capacity. The Reserve Component forces can help fill this void by training for and participating in humanitarian intervention operations.

Currently the reserve components comprise 54 percent of the Army force structure. The Army's increasing reliance on reserve component participation in ongoing contingency operations underscores the key readiness principle for the 21st Century: protect America's interests amidst a range of threats and challenges will require constant and efficient utilization of the Total Force.²⁵

The Army National Guard, for example, comprises 58 percent of the Army's combat force organized into eight divisions, eighteen separate brigades, and two Special Forces Groups. There are two ways of gaining access to reserve component personnel in peacetime. Under Title 10 United States Code 12304, ²⁶ the President may order reservists involuntarily to active duty for up to 270 days. This is known as the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) authority. The second way to gain access to additional personnel is under Title 10 United States Code 12301(d), ²⁷ which authorizes the Department of Defense to activate any reservist with the consent (voluntary call-up) of the individual. ²⁸ Regardless of the method of activation, reserve component forces stand ready to participate in intervention operations.

When utilized in support of federal missions, the Army National Guard can be considered the Army's largest command. As such the Guard continues to aggressively seek new efficiencies to accomplish these tasks. The Guard's current size and mix has allowed it the opportunity to rotate missions among units and states. This has made it possible to avoid tasking the same units repeatedly, thereby reducing the potential for personal hardship.²⁹

In a report prepared by the National Security and International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office, a review was undertaken to determine the access to individual Reserve volunteers. Their findings are summarized as follows.

The ability of the reserve components to provide volunteers for a peace operation is enhanced when advance notice of the requirement is given, but the amount of notice needed depends on the mission. Reserve officials said their personnel need time to arrange for extended absences for work and family. The more notice reserve officials are given by active commands, the greater their chances of finding volunteers. 30

Previously, Reserve Component forces were called upon only in times of crisis. Today these same Reserve Component forces are being tasked to relieve active units and reduce both operational and personnel tempo for more frequent and lengthly deployments. It is generally accepted that operations and personnel tempo will continue to stretch available resources into the foreseeable future.

There are cases where these same forces have been called on to deploy force structure for a specific mission. The President called up approximately 1,900 reservists to support the September 1994 intervention in Haiti. Prior to that call-up, the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) had been invoked only once (for the Gulf War) since its 1976 enactment. Although there were reservist that voluntarily participated in operations in Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), and Somalia (1992), there were no reserves activated under a PSRC.

There are those skeptics within the Reserve Component leadership, as well as DoD and Army officials that have speculated that increased use of Reserve Component combat forces will adversely affect enlistment, retention and morale.³² In an article authored by the Honorable Deborah Lee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, she says, "this idea holds little substance and is considered to be anecdotal, especially with FY 1996 being the best year in recent history for recruiting and retention."³³ In FY 99 the National Guard continues to make it's end-strength mission.

Reserve Component units need to be trained, equipped and resourced in preparation for a variety of ongoing and potential missions. Funding priorities should be focused toward units most likely to be activated for small-scale contingency operations. In today's environment these missions might include humanitarian intervention operations (humanitarian assistance and peace enforcement operations), weapons of mass destruction consequence management, and peacekeeping operations.

Time required to train selected units varies depending on the complexity of the mission and type of units. Even for Active Component units it is suggested that for planning purposes, units require from 4 to 6 weeks of specialized training.³⁴ When appropriately missioned, unit leadership can adopt a training methodology that focuses on critical tasks required for humanitarian assistance and intervention operations. A few of the subjects that should be included in unit training plans include:

- Enforcing UN sanctions
- Protecting the human rights of people
- · Protecting humanitarian relief efforts
- Separating warring factions

- Disarming belligerent parties of heavy offensive weapons
- Restoring territorial integrity
- Civil-military operations
- Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) operations
- Multinational logistics
- Intercultural communications

Executing refugee handling and detainee handling procedures also need to be taught, as well as legal instruction concerning rules of engagement (ROE). These subjects are in addition to typical warfighting tasks like conducting movement-to-contact, meeting engagement, raids, defense, and patrolling. These subjects are in addition to typical warfighting tasks like conducting movement-to-contact, meeting engagement, raids, defense, and patrolling.

The following comment is made by the National Defense Panel in a report submitted to the Secretary of Defense in December of 1997 concerning Reserve Component forces.

Not only will reserve forces augment and complement the active forces overseas in missions ranging from combat to peacekeeping to regional stability and contingency operations, but they will increasingly be involved in containing threats here at home. ³⁷

Within this document the National Defense Panel also makes it a point to address specifically the past relationship between the Army and its Reserve Components.

While the other services have continued to increase the integration of their active and reserve forces, the Army has suffered from a destructive disunity among its components, specifically between the active Army and the National Guard. This rift serves neither the Army nor the country well. The Panel strongly believes the rift must be healed and makes a series of recommendations towards that end.³⁸

Several of the recommendations that are relevant to the subject of this paper are:

- Infantry and mechanized battalions, for example, would be integrated as organic units of the active divisions and would deploy with them.
- The enhanced brigades should report to an active Army commander. The active commander
 would have clear responsibility and authority to oversee training and to ensure the brigade meets
 their readiness goals.
- The Guard should develop selected early-deploying units that would join the active component.
- In addition to augmenting and supporting active forces for major theaters of war, reserve support
 units play a vital role in shaping the international environment. Peacekeeping, humanitarian
 assistance, and similar missions are also important.³⁹

In a vote of confidence and recognition of the National Guard's capabilities, General Charles Wilhelm, (previous) CINC, SOUTHCOM, recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) that the Army SOUTH mission be given to the Army National Guard (ARNG) with a headquarters in Puerto Rico. 40 Additionally, Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre approved the creation of ten full-time ARNG teams to respond to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 41 In January of 2000 approval

was given for an additional 17 teams. Both of these missions allow the reserve components to fully participate in the nation's security.

DISADVANTAGE TO HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION OPERATION PARTICIPATION

Both Active and Reserve Component forces could potentially suffer a degradation of combat readiness while participating in intervention operations. The ability to practice individual and collective war-fighting skills is limited during these types of operations. In Somalia, for example, while the combat forces received extensive experience in military operations conducted in an urban environment, they were not able to practice collective skills. According to 10th Mountain Division officials, in some cases it took approximately 3 to 6 months to bring these skills back to an acceptable level. The meaning of "acceptable level" suggests that the units will be prepared to rapidly respond to a MRC.

Active forces that would be needed in the early stages of a MRC are also many of the same forces being frequently deployed for intervention and peacekeeping operations. There are forces in each service that are missing training exercises that impact overall combat readiness and their ability to redeploy directly to a MRC.

The same argument can be made for the Reserve Component forces. Although typically not at the highest possible state of readiness, Reserve Component forces will suffer similar combat readiness concerns. As with other readiness issues, senior leadership will be required to set commitment priorities and manage available resources to best accomplish all assigned missions.

OPTIONS / COURSES OF ACTION

Critical to any administration's success is its ability to clearly explain national security interests and the rational for committing forces. This commitment of forces needs to consider current policy, public and congressional support, as well as broader international issues. Maintaining a degree of flexibility is important; however, the better defined a policy is the clearer the message it sends to all stakeholders.

There are several alternatives that can and should be considered when developing a humanitarian intervention operations strategy. The strategy adopted will then represent the current administration's policy.

Alternative One: Continue with current policy.

Alternative Two: Modify current policy by better defining "risk to American troops" and "broader international assistance efforts get underway." The point here is that there needs to be a more coherent criteria for engagement and disengagement, deployment and redeployment. If a humanitarian crisis situation is truly worthy of military intervention, and it is in the United States' national interest, then at what cost in lives might the nation be willing to pay. The second modification would be to more specifically define at what point "broader international assistance efforts are underway." The aim is to present an unambiguous criteria allowing for termination of military involvement.

Alternative Three: Completely abandon unilateral humanitarian intervention operations as part of SSC operations. Rely on the United Nations Security Council to make a commitment to intervene. The

advantage of this course of action is that the burden of intervention is placed in the hands of an international authority. This would not relieve U.S. forces of all involvement, but it would focus more resources on preparation for wartime missions. In turn, U.S. forces would participate only as part of coalition or multinational forces.

Alternative Four: Increase military support for humanitarian intervention operations. The world is a different place today. The odds of a large-scale conventional conflict seem to have declined. In order to facilitate this decline the United States must make a greater commitment to ensure regional stability is maintained. It should be the United States' responsibility as the dominant world power to lead the world into the 21st century. The advantage of this course of action is that it will more appropriately allocate resources, which will ensure regional stability around the world. The disadvantage here is as there continues to be less emphasis on large-scale conventional warfare, there is a trend toward ignoring weaponry, doctrine and training needed in this type of warfare. This course of action, without additional resources allocated to the military, will have a significant negative impact on future readiness.

RECOMMENDATION

All things considered, alternative four is the most supportable. Alternatives One and Two do not address the ever-changing world environment. Alternative Three relies on building consensus and there in lies the problem. When human suffering is recognized, it becomes a moral and ethical issue. When human suffering threatens regional stability, it becomes a national security issue. Either way the issue needs to be addressed and acted on accordingly.

There needs to be a great portion of available resources used to shape, respond to, and prepare for humanitarian intervention operations. While the active component force structure has been reduced over the past decade, the number of SSC operations have increased. To help reduce the demanding OP/PERS TEMPO on Active Component units and soldiers, Reserve Component forces are being used more and more. This seems to be a workable solution given several modifications to current policy. For example, the current policy of 270 day rotations needs to be addressed with consideration to employers, families and frequency of deployments. Shorter deployments must be considered along with spreading taskings across more units so the same soldiers are not being repeatedly deployed. It only seems appropriate that Reserve Component forces be manned, trained and resourced adequately to ensure readiness levels are maintained. Reserve Component forces are prepared to deploy in support of humanitarian intervention operations as well as other SSC operations.

To employ the military as a means of relieving human suffering, the U.S. government needs to adopt a clear set of guidelines addressing commitment of forces. Both Weinberger and Perry suggested guidelines for commitment of U.S. forces in humanitarian intervention operations. These guidelines should be considered for the consistent application of assistance.

CONCLUSION

The fact that humanitarian intervention operations fall under the nation's peripheral interests seems to present a dilemma at the most senior levels of government. How does each humanitarian situation align with the United States national objectives? What is its intensity of interest, and is a particular situation addressed within the framework of current security strategy? Humanitarian issues are often a choice between morality and Realpolitik, domestic and international interests, and the will and wants of the people. The decision makers ability to link all these elements is critical to making the appropriate decisions.

When the policy-makers do make a decision to intervene, and all other elements of national power have failed to produce desired results, it is the military that gets the call. This is not to suggest that other elements of national power would not be effective given enough time and resources. However, when it comes to the relief of human suffering, time is something in very short supply.

No matter how technologically advanced the future forces become, there will always be a reliance on highly skilled and dedicated people committed to winning our nations battles. "Boots on the ground have always been and will continue to be the most effective and, in the long run, the least costly way of getting the jobs done." Today these talented people reside in both the Active and Reserve Component forces. With the continued draw-down of active and reserve forces, there will be a need for more reliance on the Reserve Component forces in support of the growing number of missions requiring combat, combat support and combat service support units.

It will not be an easy task to develop new concepts and more appropriate force structures to allow humanitarian intervention operations to succeed, but the payoff could mean saving an enormous number of lives. 44 Developing policy that guides the decision to become involved in humanitarian intervention operations, and the ultimate decision to commit U.S. military forces is a task that deserves serious consideration by the administration.

WORD COUNT = 5,121

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Former United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar made this comment in a speech at the University of Bordeaux on 24 April 1991.
- ² William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy for a New Century</u> (Washington, D.C.: The White House, October 1998), iii.
 - ³ Ibid., 5-6.
- ⁴ William S. Cohen, <u>Annual Report to the President and Congress</u> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, March 1999), 7.
- ⁵ William J. Clinton, <u>A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement</u> (Washington, D.C.: White House, February 1996), 18.
- ⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff, <u>Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War</u>, Joint Publication 3-07 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), GL-3.
- ⁷ Department of the Army, <u>Peace Operations</u>, Field Manual 100-23 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 December 1994), 6.
 - ⁸ Joint Publication 3-07, III-13.
- ⁹ Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, <u>Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents</u> (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949), 276.
 - ¹⁰ Ibid., 278.
- David J. Scheffer, Richard N. Gardner, and Gerald B. Helman, <u>Post-Gulf War Challenges to the UN Collective Security System: Three Views on the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention</u> (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 1992), 7.
- ¹² Michael Harbottle, <u>New Roles of the Military: Humanitarian and Environmental Security</u>, Conflict Studies 285 (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, November 1995), 8.
 - ¹³ Field Manual 100-23, 7.
- ¹⁴ Vincent E. Boles, <u>Military Involvement in Humanitarian Assistance Operations: Is It a Detractor to Our Strategic Interests</u> (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, June 1997), 13.
 - ¹⁵ Ibid., 14.
 - ¹⁶ Clinton, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 18.
- ¹⁷ William S. Cohen, <u>Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review</u> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May 1997), 8.
 - 18 Cohen, Annual Report, 4.
 - ¹⁹ Ibid.

- ²⁰ William J. Clinton, <u>Presidential Decision Directive 56</u> (Washington, D.C.: White House, May 1997), 1.
- ²¹ National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, <u>Improving the Utility of Presidential Decision Directive 56</u> (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 31 March 1999), i.
- Andrew S. Natsios, <u>U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse; Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies</u> (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), 1.
- ²³ For the purposes of this paper, the term "Reserve Component" primarily makes reference to the Army National Guard and Army Reserve. However, in a generic sense Reserve Component refers to the Army and Air National Guard, and Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Reserves.
- John R. Brinkerhoff, "The Army National Guard and Conservation of Combat Power," <u>Parameters</u>
 16 (Autumn 1996): 12.
- ²⁵ Louis Caldera and Dennis J. Reimer, <u>A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 2000</u> (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Congressional Activities Division, 1999), 18-20.
 - ²⁶ United States Code, Title 10, sec. 12304 (1994).
 - ²⁷ Ibid., sec. 12301 (1994).
- ²⁸ General Accounting Office, <u>Peace Operations: Reservist Have Volunteered When Needed: Report to Congressional Requesters</u> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, April 1996), 2.
 - ²⁹ William Navas, "A Force in Transition," <u>National Guard</u>, April 1997, 35.
- ³⁰ General Accounting Office, <u>Peace Operations: Reservist Have Volunteered When Needed: Report to Congressional Requesters</u>, 10.
- General Accounting Office, <u>Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts: Report to Congressional Requesters</u> (Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 1995), 52.
- ³² Stephen Duncan, <u>Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security</u> (Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 222-223.
- ³³ Deborah Lee, "Reserve Components: Unequivocal Commitment," <u>ROA National Security Report</u>, March 1998, 39.
 - ³⁴ Field Manual 100-23, 87.
- ³⁵ Kenneth P. LaMon, <u>Training and Education Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance</u> Operations (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, April 1996), 39-47.
 - ³⁶ Field Manual 100-23, 87.

- ³⁷ National Defense Panel, <u>Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century</u> (Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel, December 1997), 52.
 - 38 Ibid.
- ³⁹ Ibid., 53-54. The National Defense Panel recommendations in their entirety address four areas: 1) a series of changes should be made to the Guard's combat units, 2) the Army Guard should provide a smaller Strategic Reserve, 3) homeland defense will be a much more important mission in the future, and 4) the Army Reserve must continue to be adjusted as the Army's total force needs change.
- ⁴⁰ William L. Wimbish, III, <u>Using Army National Guard Combat Battalions for Peace Operations: A Viable Alternative for the Future</u> (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 7.
- ⁴¹ Jack Weible, "Hamre Oks Guard Teams for Weapons of Mass Destruction," <u>Army Times,</u> 9 February 1998, 20.
- ⁴² General Accounting Office, <u>Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect</u> Response to Regional Conflicts, 47.
- ⁴³ Frederick J. Kroesen, "The Most Effective Deterrent Is Still Boots on the Ground," <u>Army</u>, November 1996, 13. General Kroesen (Ret.) is the former commander in chief of U.S. Army Europe and a Senior Fellow of AUSA's Institute of Land Warefare.
- ⁴⁴ Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," in <u>Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention</u> (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 252.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Boles, Vincent E. Military Involvement in Humanitarian Assistance Operations: Is It a Detractor to Our Strategic Interests. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, June 1997.
- Brinkerhoff, John R. "The Army National Guard and Conservation of Combat Power." <u>Parameters</u> 16 (Autumn 1996): 4-16.
- Caldera, Louis, and Dennis J. Reimer. <u>A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army Fiscal Year 2000</u>. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Congressional Activities Division, 1999.
- Clarke, Walter, and Jeffrey Herbst. "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention." In <u>Learning</u> from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997.
- Clinton, William J. A National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, D.C.: White House, October 1998.
- . A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement. Washington, D.C.: White House, February 1996.
- . Presidential Decision Directive 56. Washington, D.C.: White House, May 1997.
- Cohen, William S. <u>Annual Report to the President and Congress</u>. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, March 1999.
- _____. <u>Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review</u>. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, May 1997.
- Duncan, Stephen. <u>Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard and Reserve Forces and the Politics of National Security</u>. Navato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997.
- Goodrich, Leland M., and Edvard Hambro. <u>Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents</u>. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949.
- Harbottle, Michael. New Roles of the Military: Humanitarian and Environmental Security. Conflict Studies 285. London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, November 1995.
- Kroesen, Frederick J. "The Most Effective Deterrent Is Still Boots on the Ground." <u>Army</u>, November 1996, 12-13.
- LaMon, Kenneth P. <u>Training and Education Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance Operations</u>. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, April 1996.
- Lee, Deborah. "Reserve Components: Unequivocal Commitment." <u>ROA National Security Report, March</u> 1998, 39-40.
- National Defense Panel. <u>Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century</u>. Arlington, VA: National Defense Panel, December 1997.
- National Defense University. Institute for National Strategic Studies. <u>Improving the Utility of Presidential Decision Directive 56</u>. Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 31 March 1999.

- Natsios, Andrew S. <u>U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse; Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies.</u> Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.
- Navas, William. "A Force in Transition." National Guard, April 1997, 34-35.
- Scheffer, David J., Richard N. Gardner, and Gerald B. Helman. Post-Gulf War Challenges to the UN Collective Security System: Three Views on the Issue of Humanitarian Intervention. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, June 1992.
- Thomas, Timothy L. <u>Peace Operations: The Terminology Challenge before the International Community in a Period of Post-Cold War Cooperation</u>. Fort Leavenworth: Foreign Military Studies Office, November 1993.
- United States Code. Title 10, secs. 12301, 12304 (1994).
- U.S. Department of the Army. <u>Peace Operations</u>. Field Manual 100-23. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 30 December 1994.
- U.S. General Accounting Office. <u>Peace Operations: Heavy Use of Key Capabilities May Affect Response to Regional Conflicts: Report to Congressional Requesters.</u> Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, March 1995.
- . <u>Peace Operations: Reservist Have Volunteered When Needed: Report to Congressional Requesters</u>. Washington, D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, April 1996.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. <u>Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War</u>. Joint Publication 3-07. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995.
- Weilble, Jack. "Hamre Oks Guard Teams for Weapons of Mass Destruction." <u>Army Times</u>, 9 February 1998, 20.
- Wimbish, William L., III. <u>Using Army National Guard Combat Battalions for Peace Operations: A Viable</u>
 Alternative for the Future. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 1998.